lightning-dev

Transaction revocation within transaction malleability via anyone-can-revoke hashlocks

Transaction revocation within transaction malleability via anyone-can-revoke hashlocks

Original Postby ZmnSCPxj

Posted on: April 27, 2017 13:28 UTC

The conversation thread is about the Lightning Network and whether it can be implemented without SegWit.

The participant suggests a "burn window" to prevent attackers from stealing coins but acknowledges that it still allows attackers to burn the coins. However, with a revocation transaction, the counterparty's funding can be claimed in case of fraud. A blinded revocation key is used, which only the sender knows, making it malleation-proof. The participant expresses concern about countries with difficulty accessing the internet and censorship, leading to disconnection and possible fraud by the counterparty. There was a suggestion to add a TX_NOINPUT sighash flag to allow watchers to operate even in the case of malleation, but it would require a soft fork and waiting for SegWit is a better option. The issue of transaction revocation even with transaction malleability appears to be solved. The participant questions whether their idea of selfish untrustworthy watchers is better than what the Lightning Network currently has.