bitcoin-dev

Over Half of Replace-by-Fee-Rate Replacements Are Mined

Over Half of Replace-by-Fee-Rate Replacements Are Mined

Original Postby Nagaev Boris

Posted on: February 24, 2024 20:54 UTC

The discussion revolves around the concept of determining the potential impact of transaction replacements in the Bitcoin network by examining specific variables related to transaction fees.

The key variables mentioned include the purging feerate (P) and the next block feerate (N), both of which are crucial for understanding the dynamics of transaction replacement under various scenarios. By analyzing these rates, one can calculate the maximum number of replacements an attacker could initiate to cause disruption within the network. This calculation is based on a formula that takes into account the initial and subsequent fee rates, highlighting the importance of understanding these metrics for both network security and user transactions.

The analysis further delves into the implications of different values of coefficient K, which represents the multiplier applied to the fee rate to achieve the next level of transaction replacement. With examples given for K values of 2, 1.25, and 1.1, it becomes evident how the choice of K affects the number of possible replacements, thus impacting the strength and cost of potential denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the network. A higher K value indicates fewer replacements but at a higher individual cost, whereas a lower K value increases the number of possible replacements, making it a critical factor in assessing the vulnerability of the network to such attacks.

Moreover, the conversation touches upon the significance of having access to historical data regarding the purging feerate and the next block feerate, as well as information on past Replace-by-Fee (RBF) events. Such data would be invaluable in accurately evaluating the risk and cost associated with transaction replacements over time. Additionally, the correspondence proposes a practical approach to setting the coefficient K in a way that minimizes the cost of legitimate use of RBF while imposing a cost on attackers, thereby enhancing the overall security and efficiency of the network.

An interesting aspect of the discussion is the technical suggestion on how to implement a check for sufficient increase in fee rate when attempting a transaction replacement. Two code snippets are provided as examples of how to determine if the new fee rate is adequately higher than the old rate, using simple arithmetic operations and leveraging the CFeeRate class's support for integer multiplication. This part of the discussion showcases a pragmatic approach to addressing the challenges of transaction fee management and replacement in a straightforward and efficient manner.